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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ANTI-MISCEGENATION STATUTES HELD TO
VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION AND DuE PROCESS.
In 1958 a white male and a Negro female, both residents of Virginia, were
legally married in the District of Columbia. Shortly thereafter they returned
to Virginia and were convicted of violating a state statute prohibiting inter-
racial marriage.' Both were sentenced to one year in jail, but their sentences
were suspended on the condition that they leave Virginia and not return together
for a period of twenty-five years. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
upheld the constitutionality of the statute and affirmed the convictions.2 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed unanimously. Held,
the statute is unconstitutional since it is based on invidious racial discrimination
in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court also found that the statute violated due process. Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967), rev'g 206 Va. 924, 147 S.E.2d 78 (1966).
The power of the states to regulate the capacity to marry is well recog-
nized.3 This capacity is defined as either the ability of the individual to make
a contract or his right to obtain a marriage license.4 Several criteria, derived
from canon and civil law, have been used by the states to determine the capacity
to marry. In a given instance, these criteria may be used alone or in conjunction
with other criteria to determine this capacity. 5 State regulation of marriage
serves various social purposes. For example, nonage has been used to protect
minors by barring their marriage without the consent of a parent or guardian,
but it has been held that a minor may overcome this presumption of incompe-
tence by showing that he is capable of assuming marital duties, such as support-
ing a family, and that his marriage is in the best interests of society.6 Also,
mentally incompetent persons are not allowed to marry, and physical incom-
petence may be treated in the same manner or may merely make the marriage
voidable.7 In most countries of the world, race is not a criterion used to deter-
mine the capacity to marry.8 Its use is approximately three centuries old, and
1. Va. Code Ann. § 20-58 (1960) states: "If any white person and colored person
shall go out of this State, for the purpose of being married, and with the intention of re-
turning, and be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting
as man and wife, they shall be punished.. . ." Section 20-59 provides that the punishment
for violation shall be confinement to the penitentiary for from 1 to 5 years.
2. Loving v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 924, 147 S.E.2d 78 (1966).
3. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888); Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d
120, 123 (10th Cir. 1944) ; Leon v. Torruella, 99 F.2d 851, 855 (1st Cir. 1938) ; see generally
Lanham v. Lanham, 117 N.W. 787 (Wis. 1908); P. Ryan & D. Granfield, Domestic Rela-
tions (1963).
4. See Mich. Stat. Ann. § 25.2 (1957); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43 § 1 (1954); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 245.01 (1957); cf. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-411 (1955); but cf. General Am. Life
Ins. Co. v. Cole, 195 F. Supp. 867 (D.C. Mo. 1961); R. Peck, Domestic Relations 3 (1913).
5. 1 3. Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation 112 (1891); see also H. Clark,
Domestic Relations 80-102 (1965).
6. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 7(1) (Supp. 1964); but see Idaho Code Ann. 32-202
(1947).
7. Rosander v. Rosander, 177 Kan. 45, 276 P.2d 338 (1954); Ala. Code tit. 34,
§ 101(b-1) (1953); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451:020 (1949); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-3 (1966).
8. See J. Bishop, supra note 5.
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the United States is one of only two nations in the world where it is used to
determine this capacity.9
In determining the capacity to marry, states are permitted to establish
statutory classifications to effectuate any legitimate legislative purpose. 10 To
uphold these classifications, the state must first show a legally valid purpose
such as promotion of public health, safety or welfare.1 ' But when a statute with
a legally valid purpose inflicts a substantial injury on a person, such as denying
him the right to do business, the state must meet the requirement of equal pro-
tection, which places two limitations on the classification or capacity. First,
classifications must be based on differences in character or situation that justify
the distinction, and second, the distinctions and differences must bear a reason-
able relation to the classification.' 2 For example, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,", a
statute which required the sterilization of persons convicted of a felony more
than twice was invalidated on the grounds that the classification of a person
as a felon, vis-a-vis other criminals, was not justifiable for this purpose. Even
assuming the classification is otherwise valid, a statute is nevertheless constitu-
tionally suspect if the classification is based on race.14 This presumption of
unconstitutionality operates much in the manner of the requirements of due
process by holding the statute to very high legal standards.' 5 A state may
overcome this presumption only by showing an overriding state interest, such as
preventing the spread of serious disease.'6 The person challenging the validity
of the statute must then demonstrate that it imposes invidious discrimination. 17
The arbitrariness and intention necessary to prove the discrimination invidi-
ous are shown when persons who have committed intrinsically the same offense
are treated differently by the law,' 8 when extrinsic evidence is introduced show-
ing a legislative scheme to favor one class of persons over another,1 9 or when
there is no reasonable basis to justify the classification.20 Due process now re-
quires a state to show the classification is absolutely necessary to the accom-
9. The other nation is the Union of South Africa.
10. See District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 149 (1909); United States v.
McNeill, 294 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1961).
11. See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 153 (1965); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
12. Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467, 473 (5th Cir. 1958); see also Bax-
strom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 113 (1966).
13. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
14. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ; cf. Goss v. Board of Edu-
cation, 373 U.S. 683, 686 (1963).
15. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
16. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
17. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Hughes v. Heinze,
268 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1959); Bush v. Martin, 224 F. Supp. 499, 510 (S.D. Tex. 1963);
Spahos v. Mayor & Councilmen of Savannah Beach, 207 F. Supp. 688 (S.D. Ga. 1962);
Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158, 168 (S.D. Ga. 1962).
18. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 539
(1942).
19. Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 290 (9th Cir. 1959); cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
20. Goesaert v. Cleary, 74 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Mich. 1947); cf. McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
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plishment of a legitimate legislative purpose.2' For example, protecting the
health of its citizens is a valid basis for state legislation, but where out-of-state
milk is proved to be of the same quality as milk produced in the state, the state
may not discriminate between the two unless it can prove that this is the only
feasible means of protecting its citizens' health.22
Miscegenation statutes are infrequently enforced, and their constitutionality
has not been litigated as often as has that of racially restrictive statutes in the
areas of education and public housing. 23 While there has been little recent
litigation, miscegenation statutes have been held constitutional, with one ex-
ception,24 by all the state and federal courts which have considered the ques-
tion,2r but until Loving, the United States Supreme Court had not passed on this
issue. Recently, in a Virginia case where one partner to the marriage sought
to have it annulled on the grounds that it violated the state's anti-miscegenation
statute, the Court, per curiam, remanded the case for clarification because the
record did not disclose sufficient information to enable the Court to clearly
consider the constitutional question.26 On remand, the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia affirmed without reopening the case, and the United States
Supreme Court, again per curiam, dismissed further appeal on the grounds
that the second decision of the Virginia court left the record devoid of a properly
presented federal question.27 In another recent case, the Court, in a memorandum
opinion, denied certiorari to review an Alabama decision upholding that state's
anti-miscegenation statute.28 In McLaughlin v. Florida, a Florida statute pro-
hibiting interracial cohabitation and fornication was invalidated on the grounds
that it violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment; but,
although the point was urged, the Court declined to extend its holding to strike
down Florida's anti-miscegenation statute.29
Various theories have been advanced to justify anti-miscegenation statutes.
The first, which was rejected by the state courts some time ago and has not been
argued in the federal courts, is that under the tenth amendment marriage is of
21. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
22. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
23. See generally L. Schuyler, The Caucasian Problem 220 (1944); Weinberger, A Re-
appraisal of the Constitutionality of Miscegenation Statutes, 42 Cornell L.Q. 208, 211 (1957);
Comment, 1 Duke B.J. 26, 40 (1951); Comment, 11 W. Res. L. Rev. 93, 101 (1960).
24. Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948) (4-3 decision: Traynor, J.,
writing for the majority).
25. See, e.g., Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1944); Ex parte Fran-
cois, 9 F. Cas. 699 (No.h5047) (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1879); Matter of Hobbs, 12 F. Cas. 262
(No. 6549) (D. Mass. 1871); State v. Tutty, 41 F. 753 (S.D. Ga. 1890); Jackson v. State,
72 So. 2d 114, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954); Story v. State, 178 Ala. 98, 59 So. 480
(1912) ; Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 29 Am. R. 739 (1877) ; State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 12, 121
P.2d 882 (1942); Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321 (1869); State v. Brown, 236 La. 562, 108
So. 2d 233 (1959); State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 50 Am. R. 499 (1883); Naim v. Naim,
197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749, vacated and remanded, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), on remand, 197 Va.
734, 90 S.E.2d 849, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
26. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
27. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
28. Jackson v. Alabama, 348 U.S. 888 (1954).
29. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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such fundamental concern to the states that the fourteenth amendment does not
apply to statutes regulating it.30 The contention that the record of Congressional
debates indicates that the framers of the fourteenth amendment never intended
it to apply to anti-miscegenation statutes has been advanced, but not accepted
by the courts.31 Another theory states that anti-miscegenation statutes do not
violate equal protection because they punish both offenders equally. This argu-
ment was accepted by the United States Supreme Court in an early case deal-
ing with a statute punishing interracial cohabitation and fornication, 2 but
in McLaughlin, with the same type of statute at issue, the Court rejected this
theory.3 3 While it has also been rejected by the Court when applied to the
area of public housing,34 its applicability to anti-miscegenation statutes is
still untested. Today, the principal justification offered for anti-miscegenation
statutes rests on the contention that legislatures have a reasonable basis for
enacting them and the wisdom of the legislature in so doing is not a justiciable
question.35 The older ground set forth as providing this basis, formerly accepted
by some courts36 but not persuasive today,3 7 maintains the Caucasian race is
superior to the Negro race and intermarriage begets inferior progeny. Therefore,
it was contended, anti-miscegenation statutes serve the valid purpose of pre-
serving racial integrity.38 The more modem argument asserts that racial inter-
marriage creates serious social problems, such as high divorce rates and
strains on the progeny of such a marriage, and these problems should be proper
targets for legislative action.3 9 The difficulty with this theory lies in the fact
that it applies equally to ethnic and religious intermarriage, and it would not be
accepted by the courts to uphold bans against these types of marriages.
40
Arguments against the validity of anti-miscegenation statutes begin with
the contention, applicable only where the right to marry is defined solely as
the right to contract, that they constitute an impairment of the right of a
citizen to enter into a contract.41 Anti-miscegenation statutes also are alleged
30. See State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 10 Am. R. 42 (1871); State v. Jackson, 80 Mo.
175, 50 Am. R. 499 (1883).
31. See generally Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Law and the Fourteenth Amendment:
The Original Intent, 52 Va. L. Rev. 1224 (1966); see also Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess,
part I, 332, 420, 505, 632 (1865).
32. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
33. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
34. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948); see also Cummings & Kane, Misceg-
enation, the Constitution and Science, 38 Dicta 24, 29 (1961).
35. Cf. Boineau v. Thornton, 235 F. Supp. 175 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
36. Cf. Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321 (1869); State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 50 Am. R.
499 (1883); Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287 (1871).
37. See Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
38. Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in Historical
Perspective, 52 Va. L. Rev. 1189, 1202 (1966); see also Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321 (1869);
Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955).
39. See Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17, 25 (1948) ; State v. Brown, 236
La. 562, 108 So. 2d 233 (1959); Blake v. Sessions, 94 Okla. 59, 220 P. 876 (1923) ; Se
generally A. Gordon, Intermarriage: Interfaith, Interracial and Interethnic 334-73 passi
(1964); Note, 58 Yale L.J. 472, 478 (1949).
40. Cf. Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17, 20-30 (1948).
41. See State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 10 Am. R. 42 (1871); Comment, 8 Win. & Mary
L. Rev. 133, 135 (1966).
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to deny freedom of religion by preventing the person from participating in the
marriage ceremony provided by his religion,42 but this theory is limited by the
fact that marriage can exist totally outside of any religious context.43 One of the
two major theories opposed to anti-miscegenation statutes relies on the premise
that the state can show no overriding legislative purpose to support the use
of racial classifications in regulating marriage, and concludes that these statutes
impose invidious discrimination which violates the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.44 The other major theory asserts that marriage is
a fundamental legal right and may be regulated only by a statute that is a
legitimate exercise of the state's police power in pursuit of a valid objective.
45
Advocates of this position maintain that anti-miscegenation statutes do not
meet this test and, therefore, deny due process.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court found the classifications in the
Virginia statute were based solely on race, and noted that the fourteenth amend-
ment was intended to eliminate state-imposed invidious discrimination.46 Re-
jecting the notion that equal punishment meets the requirement of equal protec-
tion,47 the Court declared that denying the right to marry on the basis of race
violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.48 It went
on to state, "the freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.",49
Marriage being a "fundamental freedom, [and a] basic civil right of man,"50
any denial of it on unsupportable grounds is "directly subversive of the principle
of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, [and] ...surely ...
deprive[s] all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law."'r
These principles, which had been annunciated in two prior concurring opinions,
were found persuasive by the majority of the Loving Court.52 They are founded
on the idea that marriage is one of the rights assured by the penumbra of the
Bill of Rights, and is therefore protected by due process.
53
Concurring, Mr. Justice Stewart reiterated his position that no statute
making the criminality of an act depend on the race of the actor can be consti-
tutionally valid.54 He asserted that in this type of case discrimination in the
42. See Applebaum, Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional and Social Problem, 53
Geo. L.J. 49, 65-67 (1964); cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
43. Wadlington, supra note 38, at 1217.
44. See generally Wadlington, supra note 38, at 1219-22; Applebaum, supra note 42, at
68-70; Cummings & Kane, supra note 34, at 32-33; cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 486, 500 (1965).
45. See, e.g., Applebaum, supra note 42, at 68-70; Wadlington, supra note 38, at
1216-19; cf. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
46. Instant case at 11-12.
47. See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
48. Instant case at 11-12.
49. Id. at 13.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Harlan & White, J.J., con-
curring); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (Stone, C.J,, concurring).
53. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
54. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964).
511
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statute is invidious per se, and the state is barred from showing any overriding
legislative purpose.55 His opinion, however, is limited to the ground that the
statute violates the equal protection clause.-5
Commentators have pointed to the unconstitutionality of miscegenation
statutes for some time, and that they are now held to deny equal protection was
not totally unexpected.57 But for a lack of interest on the part of the dominant
interest groups,68 and the lack of a properly presented case, 9 these statutes
probably would have been struck down a decade ago. Viewed in perspective,
this decision represents an inevitable conclusion, rather than a major break-
through, of the Negroes' quest for equal rights. Nonetheless, fifteen states still
retain anti-miscegenation statutes.60 These states have long been aware that the
courts will invalidate any statute not affording equal protection, and must now
realize that this applies to statutes regulating marriage. Moreover, as Loving
holds that there can be no overriding legislative purpose behind these statutes,
it is predictable that the states cannot redraft their anti-miscegenation statutes
so as to comply with the requirement of equal protection.61
The unportended result of the instant case is that marriage is now a
fundamental legal right entitled to the protection of the concept of those
liberties secured by due process. Thus, the legal requirements for statutes regu-
lating marriage will be much stricter than if the right to marry was entitled
only to equal protection requirements. Statutes regulating the capacity to
marry must not abridge, or curtail by an arbitrary and unjustified use of the
state's police power, the right to marry. The state can no longer show an over-
riding legislative purpose to uphold these statutes. In order not to constitute
an abridgement of the right to marry, statutes regulating marriage now must be
justifiable in light of all the factors bearing on the situation02 and absolutely
necessary to the accomplishment of some valid legislative purpose.03
This gives rise to the question of what will be held to constitute an abridge-
ment of the right to marry. For example, it would not seem that requiring a
55. Id.
56. Id. n.*.
57. J. Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law 345 (1959); Cummings &
Kane, supra note 34, at 52; Weinberger, supra note 23, at 222; Note, 25 Md. L. Rev. 41, 48
(1965) ; cf. Hager, Some Observations on the Relationship Between Genetics and Social
Science, 13 Psychiatry 371, 375 (1950); but see Walton, The Present Status o1 Miscegena-
tion Statutes, 4 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 28, 35 (1963).
58. See generally L. Logan, A Negro's Faith in America 27 (1945); G. Myrdal, An
American Dilemma 60-61 (1944); Comment, 1 Duke 1.J. 26, 40 (1951); but cf. F. Fanon,
The Wretched of the Earth 32 (1963).
59. See, e.g., Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
60. Ala. Code tit. 14, § 360 (1958); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 55-104 (1947); Del. Code Ann.
tit. 13, § 101 (1953); Fla. Stat. Ann. 741.11 (1964); Ga. Code Ann. § 53-106 (1961); Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.020 (Supp. 1962); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 94 (West, 1952); Miss.
Code Ann. § 459 (1956); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451:020 (Supp. 1967); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-181
(1966); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 12 (1954); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7 (1962); Tenn. Code
Ann. 36-402 (1955); Tex. Pen. Code art. 492 (1952); W. Va. Code Ann. § 4697 (1961).
61. Cf. Applebaum, supra note 42, at 49; Note, 20 S. Cal. L. Rev. 80, 84 (1946).
62. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
63. Id. at 193-94.
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blood test as a prerequisite to obtaining a marriage license is an abridgement
of this right. This requirement simply sets forth certain procedures that must
be followed before this right may be exercised and, given that the purpose of
this requirement is to prevent the spread of serious disease, these statutes are
a justifiable exercise of the state's police power. 4
However, other statutes regulating the capacity to marry, such as those
determining mental capacity, may present greater problems. These statutes
define mental incompetency in such terms as idiot, imbecile, moron, lunatic,
feeble-minded, weak-minded, of unsound mind, incurably insane and heredi-
tarily insane.0 5 Initially, the state will have to demonstrate a valid legislative
purpose in denying mentally incompetent persons the right to marry. Where
due process is at issue, courts have held that the prevention of possible harm
to the progeny of a marriage and the prevention of social problems are not
sufficiently valid purposes to justify the abridgement of a fundamental right.66
The states will have to show the possibility of more serious harm by proving
that the marriage of a mental incompetent is injurious either to some individual
or society in general.
Assuming arguendo that the state can show a valid legislative purpose,
such statutes must still be proved absolutely necessary to the accomplishment
of that purpose. It may be difficult for a state to sOiow that the marriage of, e.g.,
a feeble-minded person, would violate this legislative purpose. The state will
have to prove that there is a justifiable distinction between mentally incompetent
persons and normal persons. Insofar as these statutes impose penal sanctions,
they are now subject to challenge on the ground that the language by which
they define mental incompetency is so indefinite as to require reasonable men
to guess at its meaning.
67
In addition, the state will have to demonstrate that the means chosen to
achieve its purpose are absolutely essential to the accomplishment of that pur-
pose. If the state wishes to protect society from the problem of an abundance
of mentally incompetent persons, it must prove that, considering the present
state of knowledge on the subject, prohibiting these persons from marrying
is the sine qua non of this end. It is highly questionable whether this burden
of proof can be satisfied, and it is equally doubtful that these statutes are now
64. Comment, 37 Va. L. Rev. 339, 342 (1952); cf. Peterson v. Widule, 157 Wis. 614,
147 N.W. 966 (1914).
65. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 101(b-1) (1953); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 44-104
(1965); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 32 (1964); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 207, § 5 (1955);
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 25.6 (1957); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451:020 (Supp. 1966); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 37:9-1 (1937); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-12 (1966); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 48, § 1-5(d) (1965);
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15(1)(5) (1956); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-411 (1955); Va. Code
Ann. § 20-47 (1960); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.04.030 (1961); W. Va. Code Ann.
§ 48-2-1 (1966).
66. Cf. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 292-93 (1963); Buchanan v. Warley, 245
U.S. 60, 81 (1917); Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17, 26 (1948).
67. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1966); Cramp v. Board of Public
Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515-18 (1948);
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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on any firmer ground than statutes requiring the sterilization of certain types
of criminals.
68
The states will now have to re-evaluate their procedural apparatus for
determining the mental capacity to marry. It is doubtful that allowing a
licensing clerk to make this determination is satisfactory.69 Some states now
have procedures whereby this determination is made only after consideration
of the complete medical history of the person and on the recommendation of
several competent medical experts and, in some cases, judges.70 It is likely that
all such statutes will now be held to at least this standard.
One type of statute that probably will fall in the wake of the instant
decision is that denying an epileptic the right to marry.71 Some states have
presaged the Court in this area by repealing or amending such statutes regu-
lating the capacity to marry.72 In light of the amount of medical knowledge pres-
ently available on the subject, denying a person the right to marry by classifying
him as an epileptic is no more supportable than denying him this right by
classifying him as a Negro.
It seems that, in present day American society, the words "pursuit of
happiness" and the penumbra of rights assured by the first amendment, and
secured by the fifth and fourteenth amendments, embrace the right to advance
in society. As marriage, along with education and employment, is one of the
primary paths of advancement, 73 there is no reason for holding statutes
regulating it to a lesser standard than statutes regulating these other areas.
While this has been recognized in the case of Negroes, there is no reason to so
limit the principle. The most beneficial effect of this decision may be the im-
petus it gives the states to review their statutes regulating marriage with re-
gard to the requirements of due process.
DONALD W. MERRITT
68. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
69. Miss. Code Ann. § 461(f), as amended, [1957] Miss. Laws ch. 17, § 1; Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-411 (1955).
70. Iowa Code Ann. § 595.20 (1946); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 207, § 5 (1955); N.Y.
Dom. Re]. Law § 7(5) (Supp. 1964); but cf. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-12 (1953) which pro-
vides that a person adjudged mentally incompetent may marry if he consents to steriliza-
tion.
71. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451:020 (Supp. 1966); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-12 (1953); Va. Code
Ann. § 20-47 (1960); W. Va. Code Ann. § 48-2-1 (1966).
72. Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 101(b-1) (1953), as amended, 54 Del. Laws ch. 34 (1963);
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 25.6 (1957), as amended, [1962] Mich. Pub. Acts No. 107; N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 37:1-9 (1937), as amended, [19581 N.J. Laws ch. 158; see also Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 245.035 (1957), which was amended by [1953] Wis. Laws ch. 63 to overrule Kitzman v.
Kitzman, 167 Wis. 308, 166 N.W. 789 (1918).
73. See generally R. Bendix & S.M. Lipset, Class, Status and Power, 371-500 (1953);
R. Winch, The Modem Family 91-109 (1952).
